최신자료
Bilateral Monopoly Revisited: Price Formation, Efficiency and Countervailing Powers
In this paper, I revisit and synthesize the rich literature on price formation in bilateral monopoly. I show how traditional flat-rate price posting (e.g. price setting and price taking) is akin to Nash bargaining over wholesale price with subsequent `right-to-manage‘, while two-part tariffs are akin to `bilaterally efficient‘ Nash bargaining over both wholesale price and quantity. Outcomes under the former protocol nest price posting and the cases of pure monopoly and pure monopsony. Outcomes under the latter protocol nest all-or-nothing offers and the Walrasian outcome under two-sided price taking and trace out the contract curve. With lopsided bargaining power, outcomes under right-to-manage can lead to socially superior outcomes to those that are bilaterally efficient. Last, effects of bargaining power on markups and markdowns are chracterized.
많이 본 자료
![[팀튜링의 디지털 오디세이] 제1화 UAM의 미래](/userdata/main/incContent/sideLink/19/aaaGHKBjsPPI5g31szc-y20240605110816byhta.png)
![[2024.04] 물가상승](/userdata/main/incContent/sideLink/20/aaaGHKBjsPPI5g31szc-y20240605111046bpogp.jpg)
