최신자료
Economic Deterrence in a China Contingency
Deterring China from launching an attack on Taiwan is a central focus of U.S. and allied security planning. This planning encompasses creation and revision of military strategies, the establishment of partnerships with like-minded nations, and the gaming and simulation of conflict scenarios. Restrictive economic measures, such as sanctions, are also part of the deterrence toolkit. However, the timing, effectiveness, and desirability of these measures remain uncertain.
In this report, the authors explore a scenario involving a strong perceived likelihood that China would blockade or invade Taiwan within an ensuing three to six months. The authors discuss what economic measures the United States, Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom (UK) might employ to deter such aggression, how such measures might influence China’s actions, and how such measures might affect the global economic system. The report concludes with policy implications for U.S. and allied policymakers as they navigate an increasingly complex relationship with China. While U.S. policymakers may well institute such preemptive economic measures, the chances of success will depend heavily on the specific scenario under which the measures are instituted, and allies are highly unlikely to join in such preemptive economic measures absent strong U.S. pressure and leadership.
In this report, the authors explore a scenario involving a strong perceived likelihood that China would blockade or invade Taiwan within an ensuing three to six months. The authors discuss what economic measures the United States, Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom (UK) might employ to deter such aggression, how such measures might influence China’s actions, and how such measures might affect the global economic system. The report concludes with policy implications for U.S. and allied policymakers as they navigate an increasingly complex relationship with China. While U.S. policymakers may well institute such preemptive economic measures, the chances of success will depend heavily on the specific scenario under which the measures are instituted, and allies are highly unlikely to join in such preemptive economic measures absent strong U.S. pressure and leadership.
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