Risky collateral and default probability | 국외연구자료

KDI 경제교육·정보센터

Economic Information and Education Center

한국관련자료

Risky collateral and default probability

ECB

2026.01.13

We use a novel data set containing all corporate loans throughout the Eurozone to document a series of novel stylized facts on the relationship between collateral and the probability of default. First, we show that the pervasive empirical finding that riskier borrowers pledge collateral is driven by economists’ informational disadvantage relative to banks. Accounting for time-varying bank- and firm-specific risk factors produces negative correlations consistent with theory. Second, the relationship between pledging collateral and the probability of default is non-linear. Increasing the ex-ante collateral-to-loan ratio initially lowers the default likelihood but increases it as loans become overcollateralized. Third, this is driven by the riskiness of collateral. We estimate that an increase in the ex-ante collateral-to-loan ratio correlates with greater variance in the underlying collateral’s market value after loan origination. We develop a model featuring risk-neutral agents and risky collateral that provides intuition for these empirical patterns. Pledging risky collateral lowers lenders’ expected returns in case of default, leading them to demand more collateral to originate a loan but this diminishes a borrower’s return when a project is successful leading to less effort and a higher probability of default.

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