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Disciplining digital risk: evidence from cyber stress tests
Investment in cybersecurity in an interconnected banking system has public-good proper- ties: positive externalities can generate systemic underinvestment. Using con？dential supervi- sory data from the European Central Bank, we ？rst identify “laggard” European banks that underinvest relative to their cyber-risk pro？les, and then examine how supervisory scrutiny af- fects their incentives to invest. We exploit the 2024 ECB Cyber Resilience Stress Test (CyRST) as a quasi-natural experiment. In a di？erence-in-di？erences design, we ？nd that following the CyRST announcement, laggard banks increased cybersecurity investment by about 80% rel- ative to their peers. The response is stronger among laggards subject to high-intensity su- pervisory oversight, consistent with scrutiny exerting a disciplining e？ect. Overall, the results suggest that targeted supervisory scrutiny may help mitigate underinvestment incentives and strengthen banks’ operational risk management.
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