This paper examines how managerial type shapes firms’ investment decisions, focusing on the distinction between owner (family)-managed firms and professionally-managed firms. We estimate a flexible investment policy function which depends on productivity, capital, labor and on other firm-level state variables, and is allowed to vary systematically with managerial type. Since firm-level productivity is not directly observed, we estimate it in a first step, addressing both the endogeneity of input choices and the lack of information on physical quantities. Our analysis draws on a rich panel of Spanish manufacturing firms from 1993 to 2016 that identifies whether firm owners, or their relatives, hold managerial positions. We find that, after controlling for state variables, family-managed firms invest more on average than professionally-managed firms. Managerial type also matters for how investment responds to changes in its determinants. In particular, family-managed firms exhibit stronger investment responses to changes in productivity and capital and display more procyclical investment behavior.